SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad

SIT Digital Collections
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

SIT Study Abroad

Fall 2018

Black Gold in a Changing World: An examination
of Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil and the
possibility of a solar energy transition
Sofia Mouritsen
SIT Study Abroad

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Near and Middle
Eastern Studies Commons, and the Other Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Mouritsen, Sofia, "Black Gold in a Changing World: An examination of Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil and the possibility of a solar
energy transition" (2018). Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. 2964.
https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2964

This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please
contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.

Mouritsen 1

Black Gold in a Changing World: An examination of Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil and the
possibility of a solar energy transition
By Sofia E. Mouritsen
Fall 2018

SIT Geneva: International Studies and Multilateral Diplomacy
Advisor: Marc Finaud
Academic Director: Dr. Gyula Csurgai

Gettysburg College
Department of Political Science

Mouritsen 2

Abstract
This paper examines Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil, considering the profound effects
that the resource has on the domestic, socioeconomic, and international affairs of the Kingdom.
It is determined, after examining the economic and environmental factors that make it necessary,
that Saudi Arabia must reduce its dependence on oil and diversify its economy, ideally by
pursing solar energy. This conclusion is reached by considering Saudi Arabia’s domestic
challenges, which include unemployment and rising domestic energy demand, as well as factors
such as the price volatility of oil and changing global energy trends. A Saudi transition to solar
power is determined to be both plausible and beneficial for the Kingdom, although not without
its challenges. This paper also emphasizes the importance of the Kingdom to increase the role of
the private sector and attract foreign investment, which is necessary for the diversification
process. The current development plan, Vision 2030, is critically assessed as ambitious-looking
but somewhat limited, and next steps are recommended for Saudi Arabia to take in order to lay a
sound foundation for diversification. Finally, it is concluded that whether or not Saudi Arabia
will actually go through with this process depends on the ability of oil to continue providing the
Kingdom with power and money.
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Introduction
Focus of the Study
For Saudi Arabia, oil has been both a blessing and a curse. The resource was a driving
force for the economy and brought much wealth and welfare to the country, and yet its presence
comes with economic and environmental risks. These risks may soon become a reality, making it
important for the Kingdom to manage its dependence on oil before it leads to economic problems
and devastating environmental effects in the region that would only serve to exacerbate the
already precarious situation in the Middle East. As Luay Al-Khatteeb of the Brookings
Institution warns, “low oil prices, widening fiscal deficits, rising populations, political turmoil,
terrorism, religious intolerance and high youth unemployment conjure up a recipe for economic
disaster” in a region once set on an apparently promising economic trajectory (2015). The world
is changing, and Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil, combined with domestic challenges and
regional turmoil, seems more problematic than ever. Therefore, my research question is: what
factors make it necessary for Saudi Arabia to reduce its dependence on oil, and what are the
possibilities for the Kingdom to diversify its economy and energy sources using solar energy?
It is important to ask these questions because as a key player in the region, Saudi
Arabia’s economic and political stability has a direct influence on the countries surrounding it;
any domestic unrest or instability in Saudi Arabia could lead to spillover effects in the Gulf
region, the Middle East, and the global oil market. Studying the Kingdom’s dependence on oil
specifically is critical because the resource is closely tied to Saudi Arabia’s economic and
political stability: the resource not only legitimizes the regime but also dominates the economy,
funds the budget, and plays a substantial role in the stability of the Kingdom. However, the
ability of oil to continue stabilizing Saudi Arabia is increasingly in question, and it seems less
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and less pragmatic for the regime to continue holding onto the resource as its main source of
revenue. Therefore, it is important to explore ways in which Saudi Arabia could potentially
diversify its economy, as well as to understand the challenges with which these possibilities
come.
Literature Review
The existing literature on the diversification of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries
goes back to at least 1987, when The Rentier State, edited by Dr. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo
Luciani, was published. This book was very important in setting up the theoretical framework
that scholars would use to study oil-exporting countries for years to come. It was one of the first
scholarly pieces to study the effect of an rent-based economy on the cultural, social, and political
structures of a state, and it even discussed the challenges facing oil states that make it important
for them to transform their economies (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987). Luciani’s comparison of
allocation and production states, which informs the theory behind rentier states, was also
foundational, and he is now recognized as one of the foremost experts in the field of the
economic development of resource-rich countries.
A number of other scholars have also been integral in informing this research, including
Simone Tagliapietra, a Research Fellow at Bruegel, who has more recently published relevant
work on the political economy of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,
decarbonization policies, and renewable energy. Also integral to this research was Sebastian
Sons of the German Council on Foreign Relations, whose work on Saudi Arabia’s
socioeconomic and political challenges provided an immensely helpful base of information about
Saudi Arabia’s domestic challenges, its relationship with oil, and its need to diversify and
overcome its dependence on oil (2018). Indeed, there is a great deal of literature agreeing that
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diversification is important, but scholars reach this conclusion in different ways; some attribute
the need for diversification to economic factors, while others believe that it has more to do with
environmental or domestic factors. Therefore, this paper will bring to light these different views
and consider the importance of each. Finally, although there have been studies on the importance
of diversification and studies on renewable energy opportunities for the MENA region, the
literature was mostly focused on either one or the other instead of analyzing them both in a
future-oriented manner. This paper is an attempt to fill in these gaps and analyze not only why
diversification in the Kingdom is important but also how it could be achieved and if this will
actually happen, given the specific challenges that Saudi Arabia faces.
Research Methodology
A variety of sources informed this research, including primary data in the form of three
formal interviews and one informal interview. Of the formal interviews, one was with a
Professor at the Graduate Institute of Geneva, another with a Research Fellow at the Brusselsbased think tank Bruegel, and the third was with a Professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy.
The informal interview took place with a Green Economy and trade specialist at the UN
Environment Program. Two of these interviews were organized over email, the third formal
interview was organized face-to-face, and the informal interview took place spontaneously. All
of the interviews were conducted ethically and respected the Human Subjects Review guidelines:
formal interviewees were informed of their full privacy rights, including the right to refuse to
answer any questions or parts of questions, request anonymity, and to make any other privacy
requests that would make them feel more comfortable. None of these rights were requested by
the interviewees, but all were aware of their ability to do so. These interviews were used as a
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way to gather information on diversification, energy, and Saudi Arabia from different academic
and professional perspectives, as well as to fill in the information gaps in the existing literature.
This research was also informed by a great deal of qualitative literature on the economic,
political, and energy context of Saudi Arabia. The sources used ranged from peer-reviewed
journal articles to books to op-eds to articles from think tanks. Some of these sources were
reviewed simply for context, but the majority dealt specifically with renewable energy reform,
sustainable development, the political economy of Saudi Arabia and the MENA region, and
economic diversification. Many of these sources were found at the Graduate Institute of Geneva,
as well as through online databases, and several included qualitative data and statistics about the
energy use or economy in Saudi Arabia and other MENA countries. In the collecting of all data
and information, ethical considerations were taken into account and the sources were chosen for
their relevance and credibility.
Definitions and the Analytical Framework
This paper will make use of several technical terms that are defined in this section. The
first is rentier state, a term that refers to states that derive their national revenues from external
sources and foreign companies that exploit their resources, such as oil (Sillitoe, 2014, p. 157).
Terms associated with solar power will also be used, including photovoltaic (PV), which refers
to a device that generates electricity from sunlight via an electronic process that occurs naturally
in semiconductors. In this process, the sun frees the electrons, allowing them to travel through a
circuit and power anything from small electronics to large businesses (Solar Energy Industries
Association, 2018). Another term that will be used is concentrated solar power (CSP), which
uses mirror configurations to “concentrate the sun’s light energy onto a receiver and convert it
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into heat", which can then be used to “create steam to drive a turbine to produce electrical
power” (SolarPACES, 2017).
The theoretical framework will consider from both an economic and an environmental
perspective the importance of diversification away from oil, an analysis that will be informed by
a knowledge of Saudi Arabia’s relationship on oil and its identity as a rentier state. This will then
be contextualized globally in an examination of changing global energy trends and possible
effects on the Kingdom’s ability to continue exporting oil. The framework then becomes more
future-oriented and theoretical, considering the benefits and challenges that would come with a
transition to solar energy. To round out the analysis, the importance of the private sector and
foreign investment will be considered, as will Saudi Arabia’s current efforts to diversify its
economy. Finally, the analysis will conclude by considering next steps for the Kingdom to take
towards diversification and the factors that would drive the Kingdom to actually do so.

Analysis
The Role of Oil in Saudi Arabia
In Saudi Arabia, oil is more than just a resource. It defines the system of governance,
affects its foreign policy, and “is part and parcel of the social contract” (Jalivand & Westphal,
2018, p. 2). Oil played a fundamental role in the development of the Kingdom: oil exports and
revenues were the driving force that created the middle class, allowed the kingdom to implement
a national welfare system, and significantly improved the living condition of Saudis in the 2000s.
It was oil that gave Saudi Arabia an economy strong enough to join the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2005, oil that led the country to become the 19th largest world economy
by 2014, oil that allowed public spending to quadruple in a decade, and oil that provided the
capital to fund programs focused on improving “education, health, social welfare, infrastructure,
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and transport” (Sons 2018, p. 126). Socioeconomic development remains “heavily reliant on
high oil incomes and is therefore vulnerable to oil price fluctuations”; when prices are low,
economic progress is difficult and the Saudi welfare system is directly affected (2018, p. 127).
The effect of the oil price on the budget and social programs is particularly important
because Saudi Arabia is a rentier state. As a rentier state, the Kingdom receives a flow of income
from oil rents paid by external sources, allowing it to fund an extensive national national welfare
system without taxing its citizens. This creates a paternalistic relationship between the state and
the subjects: the citizens relies on the state as a caretaker and energy provider and the state
retains a great deal of power (Sons, 2018, p. 127). Saudi Arabia is the strongest absolute
monarchy in the world, and its rulers use the allocation of oil revenues to legitimize this power.
However, holding this amount of power also means that the Saudi leadership must continue to
“provide future prospects in terms of job opportunities, welfare, and security for its own
population”; if it fails to do so, “both its legitimacy and domestic stability may be damaged”
(2018, p. 126). Thus, as a rentier state, the Saudi government is able to hold a great deal of
power, but this power is largely dependent on its ability to fund programs for the people, which
is in turn dependent on a continued flow of oil rents.
Unfortunately for the Saudi leadership, oil revenues do not flow at a constant level. For
example, after the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010 and 2011, there was “a dramatic decline in the
oil price following a period of high and stable prices” (Jalivand & Westphal, 2018, p. 3).
Additionally, in the past when prices fell to below $30 per barrel, many governments, including
Saudi Arabia, were running deficits and had to draw from their foreign reserves (2018, p. 6).
Fluctuating oil prices have a direct impact on the Saudi budget, and low or declining oil prices
have resulted in historically high budget deficits in Saudi Arabia. This was illustrated about five
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years ago, when the budget went “from a 6.5 GDP surplus in 2013 to a -2.3 deficit in 2014” as a
result of declining oil export revenues and a decline in foreign exchange assets and savings
(Sons, 2018, p. 128). There is no doubt that oil plays a very important role in the Saudi economy;
however, although oil was fundamental to Saudi Arabia’s economic development, it seems
reductionist to define its effect on the economy as entirely benevolent.
In addition to its domestic effects, oil directly affects Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and
defines its relationship with the rest of the world (2018, p. 125). As Marc Finaud, Senior
Program Advisor at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy explained, Saudi Arabia uses oil as a
major tool of influence in its foreign policy (personal communication, November 22, 2018). For
example, the United States has historically been in favor of a free flow of oil, which has had a
significant impact on its relationship with oil-friendly regimes like Saudi Arabia. As Jalivand &
Westphal explain, this attraction to resources has allowed several leaders and regimes in the
MENA region “to sustain their rule in part thanks to Washington’s political, financial, and
military support” (2018, p. 3). According to Finaud, Saudi Arabia never really needed financial
support, but it does need security guarantees and military support, and it can use oil as a tool to
guarantee these. He also added that there always has been a connection between oil and the arms
market, as the availability of oil resources is closely connected to the potential to buy and
reexport weapons as a means of influence. Finaud also mentioned that Saudi Arabia has the
power to keep oil prices down or let them go up, which can be a very powerful tool for the
Kingdom because many countries in the oil market are dependent on a high oil income (personal
communication, November 22, 2018). Therefore, not only does oil have a strong domestic effect
on Saudi Arabia, it also plays a role in defining the extent of its international influence.
The Economic Importance of Diversification
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The existing literature on Saudi Arabia overwhelmingly agrees that the Kingdom needs to
reduce its dependence on oil and diversify its economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
perceives danger in an economic reliance on oil, arguing that hydrocarbon prices are “a key
source of macroeconomic volatility” (2016, p. 15), making the Saudi economy vulnerable to
developments in the global oil market. After all, oil revenues account for around “90 percent of
central government fiscal revenues and 85 percent of export revenues and the oil sector
comprises over 40 percent of overall GDP”, meaning that when oil prices fall, this can
significantly affecting the Kingdom’s budget and socioeconomic situation (Sons, 2018, p. 128).
In addition, Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil poses a problem because “natural resources, above
all, oil resources, impose a limit on growth opportunities” (Aoun, 2009, p. 152). Limited
economic growth is the opposite of what the Kingdom needs right now, as it faces domestic
challenges of a growing population, growing domestic energy demand, and a high
unemployment rate. As Dr. Aoun, director of the Center for Energy at the French Institute for
International Relations, calculated, if Saudi Arabia is to support its growing population, half of
which is under the age of 25, it needs a growth rate of 6 percent, not economic stagnation (2009,
p. 154).
In tandem with its growing population, domestic energy demand in Saudi Arabia is also
rising at an unsustainable rate (Nachet & Aoun, 2015, p. 6). This means that the Kingdom must
use more and more of its oil to satisfy domestic demand rather than exporting it (Jalivand &
Westphal, 2018, p. 5), resulting in reduced revenues and a national budget under pressure. In
fact, some scholars believe that domestic energy demand could outpace production and that
Saudi Arabia might eventually become a net importer of energy if consumption continues at the
current rate, which could pose a serious problem for the Kingdom (Nachet & Aoun, 2015, p. 6).
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To add to these challenges, Saudi Arabia is faced with a high unemployment rate due to its
growing population and its employment of a large number of expatriates. The IMF believes that
greater economic diversification could ameliorate these problems, asserting that diversification
“would unlock job-creating growth, increase resilience to oil price volatility and improve
prospects for future generations” by broadening the government revenue base and reducing its
reliance on oil (IMF, 2016, p. 3).
It is clear that a continued reliance on oil would be problematic for the Kingdom; as Sons
warns, “long-term administrative inefficiency, rapidly rising domestic energy consumption, and
an oil-reliant mono-economy have resulted in chronic socioeconomic problems characterized by
rising youth employment and social frustration” in Saudi Arabia (2018, p. 128). There is no
doubt that the Kingdom needs a “sustainable and full-fledged economic diversification to
overcome oil dependency by strengthening the non-oil sector, creating job opportunities, and
modifying domestic energy consumption” (Sons, 2018, p. 136). The IMF states that in addition
to insulating the country from volatile prices, diversification would “create high-value-added
private sector jobs for nationals” and establish a non-oil source of revenue that will be needed in
the future. Indeed, as Anthony Cordesman of the Center for International and Strategic Studies
asserts, “the time when SA could rely on oil wealth alone is over, and its current overdependence on the petroleum sector is creating growing economic, political, and military risks”
(2003, p. 218). The existing literature overwhelmingly agrees that for economic, environmental,
global, and domestic reasons, Saudi Arabia must reduce its reliance on oil or face serious
challenges in the future.
The Environmental Importance of Diversification
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Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil does not only affect the present, however; it also
defines the possibilities of its future. After all, given that the wealth of a oil-based rentier state
relies on a finite resource, rentier states are by nature a passing phenomenon. In 1987, Giacomo
Luciani put forth two possibilities for the future of rentier states: In one scenario, “rentier states
might structurally pursue a process of diversification of their domestic economic bases and
gradually turn into production states”, while in the other, “rentier states might continue
unchanged until the last drop of oil is exported, and then simply fold up” (Tagliapietra, 2017, p.
11). In other words, a rentier state will eventually either shift away from a reliance on external
rents to sustain its economy, or it will keep exporting oil as long as it possibly can. Either way,
the rentier state will eventually end, whether it is by voluntary transition or collapse. According
Simone Tagliapietra, this second scenario might be approaching more quickly than Luciani had
anticipated. This is not because of the physical depletion of oil—as of 2008, Saudi Arabia held
264.3 billion barrels in reserves (Aoun 2009, p. 146)—but rather due to a global reorientation
away from fossil fuels that could weaken demand for oil (Tagliapietra, 2017, p. 12).
Because of international decarbonization policies and technological advancements,
Tagliapietra suggests that oil reserves might be stranded before they even run out (2017, p. 11),
giving a country like Saudi Arabia even more of an incentive to diversify its economy as soon as
possible. Indeed, the world is changing, and as countries are increasingly realizing the imminent
dangers caused by global warming, some are willing to commit to decarbonization initiatives,
such as the European Union, which Tagliapietra explained has committed to full decarbonization
by 2050 (personal communication, October 1, 2018). If these agreements and initiatives become
ambitious and are taken seriously, this could have a large effect on demand for fossil fuels. If at
this time Saudi Arabia’s economy remains dependent on oil revenues, such a decline in demand
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could seriously harm its economy. Although the Kingdom 63 years to go before its oil reserves
are physically depleted, by Bruegel’s estimate, Tagliapietra suggests that demand for oil could
become uncertain before this day arrives (2017, p. 12).
This conclusion is based on the implementation of international agreements such as the
Paris Agreement, signed by 175 parties, which has the goal of keeping the global temperature
“well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels” (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 2018). If the agreement is successful, a third of global oil
reserves should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to reach the agreement’s temperature
target, meaning that Middle Eastern oil exporters would only be able to exploit about 60% of
their reserves (Tagliapietra, 2017, p. 13). Furthermore, this would cause global oil demand will
sharply fall after 2020. Middle Eastern oil exports could remain stable until 2040, but after that
time oil revenues would decline (2017, p. 14). Jalivand & Westphal agree that adherence to the
Paris Agreement requires a “fundamental global energy system transformation” and that the 2
degree global warming target will have a substantial effect on energy systems, which make up
two-thirds of global greenhouse emissions (2018, p. 3). Furthermore, Sons predicts that as the
global energy transition gains more momentum, Saudi Arabia’s role as a significant fossil fuel
exporter could dwindle, making the need to reduce its dependence on oil “more urgent than ever
before” (2018, p. 132). Of course, it may be too optimistic to assume that the world will actually
achieve its emission targets, but it seems dangerous for Saudi Arabia to make this gamble if it
seeks to ensure its economic stability in the future.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is by no means exempt from the effects of global warming
and is in fact “highly vulnerable to the adverse effects of global warming thanks to its arid and
dry climate.” When this vulnerability is combined with the fact that Saudi Arabia contributes
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substantially to CO2 emissions, climate change becomes a double-edged sword for the Kingdom
(Sons, 2018, p. 135). Energy efficiency levels in the MENA region are among the lowest
worldwide, and a MENA resident emits more than twice the amount of CO2 than does the
average world citizen (Jalivand & Westphal, 2018, p. 4). In short, “MENA countries contribute
substantially to climate change” (p. 5), and this could have devastating effects on the region; if
climate change continues to worsen, the region could eventually become uninhabitable, leading
to mass migration (p. 7). Furthermore, rising temperatures will lead to increased energy
consumption, which will serve to exacerbate the problem, making it even more urgent for Saudi
Arabia to pursue a diversified energy portfolio (Hamedi, 2014, p. 107).
Solar Power: Opportunities and Challenges
There is little doubt that Saudi Arabia needs to diversify both its economy and energy
sources in order to safeguard itself from economic and environmental disaster. Such a
diversification strategy ought to be able to withstand changing global energy trends and the
depletion of oil reserves; as Cornel Gavata of the Geneva School of Diplomacy explained,
although Saudi Arabia might not be able to change the fact that it is dependent on energy
exports, it can still begin exporting non-oil derived energy (personal communication, November
16, 2018). A diversification plan based on renewable energy certainly seems to be the ideal
scenario for Saudi Arabia, as it would help prevent both the environmental and energy crises that
are currently looming over the Kingdom (El-Saddik 2015, p. 26). Given the country’s location
and resources, it seems that there is considerable potential for diversification based on solar
energy.
For countries that have sufficient amounts of sun, such as those in the GCC (Gulf
Cooperation Council), solar power can serve as a “non-diminishing alternative to fossil fuel for
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generating electrical power” (Abdulla, 2015, p. 193). Kassem El-Saddik, PhD candidate at the
School of Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University, agrees that solar resources
are abundant and should be taken advantage of (2015, p. 26). Not only does the Kingdom has
enough sun, he adds that it likely has enough wealth and could feasibly “invest in alternative
energy technology and harvest the infinite solar energy that is available all year long in the
region” (2015, p. 28). Dr. Mayami Abdulla of the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge agrees
that the amount of solar radiation that the GCC region receives is unrivaled, and that the options
for solar panels, such as PVs, are safe, freely available, only require a small cost for
maintenance, and have a life expectancy of 20-30 years (2015, p. 198). Finally, as Gavata
pointed out, the majority of region is desert and much of it is uninhabited, meaning that large
areas could be used for solar panels without displacing very many people (personal
communication, November 16, 2018).
Furthermore, as Abdulla points out, a transition to solar energy would help meet rising
domestic demand while also addressing the social, economic, and environmental pillars of
sustainability (2015, p. 193). Currently, the Kingdom is being forced to use its oil to satisfy
domestic demand, but if it began to use solar power to satisfy domestic consumption, this would
free up the amount of oil available for export, providing the Kingdom with more revenue (2015,
196). There seems to be a general agreement that it would be better for Saudi Arabia to use its oil
for exporting rather than for satisfying its increasing domestic demand, and harnessing solar
power would help the Kingdom achieve this. As Abdulla adds, a more diversified energy
portfolio has the additional benefit of reinforcing the economy and helping it sustain its
economic leadership in the world “by reducing the high cost of fuel subsidies” (2015, p. 197).
Not only this, Panzer and Auer feel confident that “even the strong electricity demand growth
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rate does not represent a significant challenge for CSP plants to meet future domestic electricity
demand” (2014, p. 226). Additionally, because solar radiation is so strong in Saudi Arabia, they
believe that CSP power generation has even been cost competitive since 2011 (2014, p. 231).
Furthermore, a transition away from oil and towards solar power could help provide jobs
for the large number of unemployed Saudis. As Tagliapietra explains, “The development of
large-scale renewable energy projects in the MENA region could generate thousands of new
jobs”, making a transition to solar potentially very beneficial for the Kingdom (2012, p. 53).
Indeed, the International Renewable Energy Agency, headquartered in Abu Dhabi, has indicated
that “all available studies show that renewable energy is associated with significant gross job
creation” (2012, p. 53). However, as Luciani explained, if these benefits are to be realized, the
government must stop employing large numbers of expatriates as a source of cheap labor, which
takes jobs away from the Saudis who refuse to work at such a low wage (personal
communication, November 5, 2018). Therefore, while a focus on solar energy would help create
jobs, it is also important for the government to rethink its labor strategy if it really wants to see
the unemployment rate go down, specifically by “increasing productivity, wages, reducing the
number of expatriates and increasing the capital intensity in the economy” (personal
communication, November 5, 2018).
Although the benefits of a transition to solar are notable, is it actually feasible for the
Kingdom to make this kind of transition? Some scholars like Panzer and Auer say yes, arguing
that “renewable solar power production is an economically and technically feasible remedy” and
that using CSP plants for power generation may even be attainable today (2014, p. 232). Despite
this confidence, it is important to recognize that a transition to solar energy would not be without
its challenges. The Kingdom would have to consider the logistical complications of harnessing
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solar power, the restrictions of its current economic situation, and the barriers to implementation
inherent in the Saudi system of governance.
For instance, as Luciani cautioned, the desert is dusty, and solar panels are vulnerable to
the sand that frequently gets lifted into the air. They also need to be constantly, carefully cleaned,
otherwise they can get scratched; this is especially important when one makes use of
concentrated solar power panels, whose mirrors are especially vulnerable. For example, humidity
can pose a problem because it deposits on the mirrors and affects the ability of the solar panels to
function well. Furthermore, Luciani explained that the sun does not shine so much during the
summer in Saudi Arabia, and that there is in fact usually a light cover of very high clouds; not
only this, Luciani noted that photovoltaic solar panels work best at lower temperatures and might
not work very efficiently if used in a region that warms up to 50 or 60 degrees Celsius (personal
communication, November 5, 2018).
Additionally, scholars disagree on whether or not Saudi Arabia has the financial capacity
to heavily invest in solar panels. According to UN trade and green economy specialist Elena
Antoni, Saudi Arabia does have the money to invest quickly in new projects, but the problem is
that any action requires a state decision, which might prove difficult to obtain (personal
communication, October 18, 2018). Tagliapietra echoed the fact that Saudi Arabia has “plenty of
money” to invest in research and development for solar energy solutions, and added that the
Kingdom could additionally make use of “sovereign wealth funds, public money they earn
through oil export, to invest in new technology” (personal communication, October 1, 2018).
Additionally, the costs for solar photovoltaics have come down significantly in recent years,
making a transition to solar energy even more financially possible (Jalivand & Westphal, 2018,
p. 3).
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Although some are confident about the Kingdom’s ability to finance a solar energy
transition, Gavata believes that Saudi Arabia does not have sufficient financial resources to make
such a transition happen. He argued that if the main energy consumers like the European Union,
China, Japan, South Korea, and India do not contribute and share resources, such a transition
cannot be achieved at all. Gavata added that for solar energy to become more cost competitive, it
must be mass produced, which would require international cooperation; only then, he says, will a
large number of countries begin exploiting solar energy. In his view, the world can only make an
energy switch if existing large consumers cooperate in mutually beneficial, global ways
(personal communication, November 16, 2018).
Before global cooperation can be conceived of, however, the Kingdom must first commit
to a solar energy transition. At the moment, the Kingdom lacks a coherent, integrated, and
comprehensive plan for the exploitation of solar energy (Bryde & Mouzughi, 2015, p. 12). This
is not to say that the Kingdom has been completely uninterested in harnessing solar energy; on
the contrary, it has planned to install 41 gigawatts of solar energy by 2032 (El-Saddik, 2015, p.
26) and had already installed 23.2 MW of solar energy by the end of 2015 (Damoom et al., 2018,
p. 26). However, El-Saddik has criticized the Kingdom for failing to put in place “any new
regulations to influence energy consumption behavior” and promote small scale renewable
schemes (2015, p. 26). Additionally, Saudi Arabia has not put in place policy or legislation
supporting extensive deployment of renewable energy (Abdulla 2015, p. 200), indicating that
although the Kingdom has some plans in place to install solar energy, it remains either
disinterested in or uncommitted to a serious energy diversification process. As Luciani
concluded, the actual implementation of a diversification plan or an uptake of alternative energy
sources is lagging (2014, p. 8).
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The Private Sector and Foreign Investment
Part of the reason that Saudi Arabia has not committed to an ambitious diversification
plan is because it has not fully realized the importance of the private sector and foreign
investment. In order for the Kingdom to secure its future economic, environmental, and domestic
well-being, it must diversify its economy, and for that, it needs the private sector. As Son
explains, “the private sector needs more support to transform Saudi Arabia into a non-fossil fuel,
industrial-based economy that attracts foreign investors” (2018, p. 136). Luciani adds that if a
country is to diversify its energy sources and pursue greater energy efficiency, this will
“inevitably entail much greater involvement of the private sector” (2014, p. 17). Furthermore,
although GCC countries have been doing well with a state-led model, challenges lie ahead,
including employment for nationals, sustaining a high economic growth rate, and funding
development projects. The private sector “can significantly contribute to meeting and addressing
these challenges” by helping to reduce the reliance on oil revenues (Bryde & Mouzughi, 2015, p.
7). Cordesman agrees that “if Saudi Arabia is to cope with its political, demographic, and social
challenges”, it needs a diversified economy that depends on the private sector for success (2003,
p. 218). He argues that it is “absolutely critical” for Saudi Arabia to expand its private sector in
order to ensure its welfare as a nation and its future stability (2003, p. 388). Not only do scholars
agree that privatization would benefit the Kingdom, Callen et al. of the IMF warn that unless
more nationals are employed in the private sector, unemployment will likely rise (2014, p. 9).
Unfortunately, the precarious relationship between the public and private sector in Saudi
Arabia makes a private sector expansion rather unlikely. Luciani explained that because the
Saudi government feels that it should always be in control, it restricts the private sector to doing
what it tells it to do. Naturally, the private sector does not appreciate this. “It’s not an easy
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interface to navigate.” Luciani admitted. At the moment, he sees little sign that the government is
ready to genuinely widen the scope for the private sector. However, he acknowledges that this
could change, as the pendulum has swung in favor of the private sector in the past. He concluded
that whether or not this will occur has to do with the power structure at the top (personal
communication, November 5, 2018). It is also worth noting that the rentier model of governance
naturally inhibits private sector growth and innovation, revealing another hurdle over which the
Kingdom may have to pass (Bryde & Mouzughi, 2015, p. 5). All in all, it does not seem likely
that the Kingdom will relinquish much power to the private sector any time soon, ensuring that
its attempts to diversify the economy will be missing a key piece and therefore less effective.
Additionally, Saudi Arabia cannot ignore the importance of foreign investment in the
diversification process. The Kingdom will have to work to improve the current business
environment, as investors are put off by the “geopolitical nightmare posed by ISIS”. This caused
foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia to fall from $39.5 billion in 2008 to just $8 billion in
2014 (Al-Khatteeb, 2015). Not only this, Saudi Arabia is tainted by corruption, which is common
for rent-seeking states given that “a significant part of hydrocarbon rents is diverted from official
flows and often goes directly to individuals or groups in power positions” (Aoun, 2009, p. 157).
In an opacity index conducted by the Kurtzman group analyzing the “the cost to businesses of a
lack of transparency in a country’s legal, economic, regulatory and governance structures”, Saudi
Arabia scored 46/100, meaning that doing business in Saudi Arabia requires a return of 5.52
percent above the US rate of return in order to offset the risk (Aoun, 2009, p. 158). These risks
comprise anything from fraudulent transactions to bribery to regulatory complexity to
unforeseeable contracts (p. 158)—anything that might impact business and deter investment.
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Although Callen et al. consider the business climate in the GCC relatively favorable, they
acknowledge that challenges remain, including “restrictive labor regulations, an inadequately
educated workforce, inefficient government bureaucracy, and, to some extent, lack of access to
finance as key factors inhibiting private sector activity” (2014, p. 21). Al-Khatteeb adds that
investors are put off by overly bureaucratic laws that often impose restrictions on ownership and
employment, restrictions that “seemingly discourage diversification and the growth of the private
sector” in many countries (2015). Because a strong private sector is necessary for diversification,
Saudi Arabia should seriously consider changing some of these laws. More generally, the
Kingdom “must move to diversify its economy, strengthen its private sector, and encourage
foreign and domestic investment as aggressively as possible” (Cordesman, 2003, p. 218).
Current Diversification Efforts
Saudi Arabia has indeed begun taking steps in the direction of decreasing its dependence
on oil, increasing foreign investment, and increasing the role of the private sector. These
priorities are reflected in its development plan, Vision 2030, which boasts the goal of “a fullfledged diversification of the Saudi economy away from oil dependency”. The Kingdom claims
that ‘within 20 years, we will be an economy or state that doesn’t depend mainly on oil’ and that
by 2030 the share of oil and gas in overall GDP should decrease from 47% to 11% (Sons, 2018,
p. 132). According to Bruegel, the plan also looks to increase foreign direct investment from 3.8
percent to 5.7 percent by 2030, to increase the private sector’s contribution from 40 percent to 65
percent of GDP by 2030, to raise the share of non-oil exports in non-oil GDP from 16 percent to
50 percent by 2030, and to increase non-oil government revenue from SAR 163 billion to SAR 1
trillion by 2030 (Tagliapietra, 2017, p. 17). The plan also intends to shuffle personnel in the
energy administration, privatize the oil company Saudi Aramco, and increase energy efficiency
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(Sons, 2018, p. 133). Furthermore, it looks to cut energy subsidies, which the Kingdom hopes
will decrease domestic energy consumption, as well as to increase its renewable energy to 9.5
GW by 2030, diversify the petrochemical industry, and become a reliable partner in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2018, p. 134).
Despite its impressive appearance, many scholars are critical of Vision 2030. Sons is
skeptical of the Kingdom’s ability to actually achieve its goal of increasing renewable energy,
and he has noted that the plan fails to support or subsidize energy-efficient industrial and
residential behaviors or seek to change the mentality of energy consumers (2018, p. 133). While
the Vision appears to be an ambitious strategy, Sons explains that “it is (thus far) lacking in
details and can at present be characterized as old wine in new bottles rather than as a new and
innovative reform agenda” (2018, p. 135). Luciani agrees that the plan is not exactly
groundbreaking. “I’ve personally been skeptical of Vision 2030 from the start,” he says, “and
you know, I think so far, skepticism has proven to be well justified.” Furthermore, Sons doubts
that Saudi Arabia will be able to institute any substantial renewable energy reform, given that the
Kingdom’s potential progress in this field is “limited by a lack of know-how and expertise,
technological difficulties, and the mentality of energy users accustomed to subsidized fossil
resources rather than alternative energy” (2018, p. 34).
Although the goals of Vision 2030 indicate that the Kingdom understands the importance
of diversification, it remains to be seen whether or not Saudi Arabia will stay on track with all of
its goals. In truth, it does not seem like Saudi Arabia is ready to commit to diversification or an
energy transition. Even though the Kingdom has put forth a diversification plan and participated
in relevant UN events, Sons believes that these are likely just attempts to be accepted as a
responsible and reliable part of the multilateral community; he doubts that these actions really

Mouritsen 25
represent a commitment to the implementation of sustainable climate policy (2018, p. 135).
Tagliapietra adds that economic diversification plans “have been a part of MENA oil exporters’
rhetoric for a long time” (2017, p. 16); these plans are usually put in place when oil prices are
low and quickly abandoned when prices recover (personal communication, October 1, 2018).
Because of this, Tagliapietra recommends that oil-exporting countries adopt a structural path
towards diversification, pursued without deviation “in order to ensure both political stability and
socio-economic prosperity” (2017, p. 18). Unfortunately, it does not seem that Saudi Arabia has
adopted this kind of focus; as Antoni explained, the Kingdom even skirts away from
conversations about trade and the environment in WTO forums (personal communication,
October 18, 2018). This hardly seems like the attitude of a country that is ready to make a
substantial commitment to economic and energy source diversification.
Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to reduce its reliance on oil, despite the obvious benefits of
a transition to solar energy, might be attributable to its identity as a rentier state. As earlier
mentioned, the Kingdom derives its power from redistributing oil rents to the population in the
form of social programs; it is an unspoken agreement that citizens receive rent in return for
loyalty and little or no taxation (Mishrif, 2018, p. 3). In this way, it is the exact opposite of a
democracy, which exalts the principle “no taxation without representation”—a rentier state
mirrors this principle with its own, “no representation without taxation”. Because of this, citizens
do not demand political participation or representation, and the rulers can continue to hold a
great deal of power without legitimizing it through democratic representation (Tagliapietra,
2017, p. 10). Given that its power is largely dependent on its ability to continue distributing oil
rents, it makes sense that the Kingdom would not be overly eager to make a serious transition
away from the oil market.
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Even if the Kingdom were to overcome this power-based unwillingness to take on solar
energy initiatives, the structure of the Saudi government makes it difficult for the Kingdom to
actually implement any such initiatives. Luciani explains that although he considers the Saudi
government committed to investing in clean energy, it runs into a problem when decisions have
to be made; not only is the decision-making power concentrated at the top, the attention of the
top is difficult to get, making the government not well-suited to decision-making. A solar energy
transformation would, of course, require numerous decisions to be made, and the power structure
of the government would make this a cumbersome process. Therefore, the Kingdom’s continued
dependence on oil for revenue and energy, despite the economic and environmental risks this
poses, can be attributed to a power-and-logistics-based unwillingness to commence a
diversification process based on solar energy.
Next Steps
Although the Kingdom’s current diversification plans leave something to be desired, it is
still possible that the Kingdom will more fully realize the importance of reducing its dependence
on oil. If this happens and Saudi Arabia becomes ready to transform its economy, there are
several things that must be done in order for it to succeed. As the IMF states, economic
diversification requires “sound fiscal policy and framework, effective liquidity management and
prudent monetary policy, supportive financial sector policies and a fairly valued exchange rate”
(2016, p. 3). Additionally, in order to unlock the potential of the private sector, the Kingdom
must put in place strong regulatory and institutional frameworks and improve the business
environment (2016, p. 3). In order to achieve the latter, the Kingdom could focus on political
reform and increasing accountability as a way of making a more “predictable and businessfriendly environment for investors” (Sons, 2018, p. 136). Other important steps in improving the
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business climate include “streamlining procedures, strengthening economic governance and
transparency, and reducing regulatory barriers to competition”. These are foundations that must
be laid before the private sector can become a driver of the diversification process (IMF, 2016, p.
3-4).
Additionally, as Al-Balushi explains, for domestic and foreign investment to grow, the
Kingdom must seek structural policy reforms; this will also allow areas of comparative
advantage to naturally develop (2015, p. 91). As the IMF recommends, oil-exporting countries
should focus on reorienting public spending and implementing labor reforms “to incentivize
private sector employment of nationals and improvements in productivity” (Callen et al., 2014,
p. 4). This is important because as Tagliapietra explained, a low level of labor productivity is
“one of the major barriers for economic diversification in MENA oil exporters”, given that it
“prevents the development of an internationally-competitive private sector” (2017, p. 6). It is
also important for the Kingdom to encourage firms to develop export markets, as this will
contribute to export diversification, as well as to help workers acquire the skills and education
that will make them more productive (Callen et al., 2014, p. 4). Finally, Finaud pointed out that
an energy transition requires a scientific and industrial base, which Saudi Arabia currently does
not have, so it should also focus on research, development, and education (personal
communication, November 22, 2018). The Kingdom has a lot of work ahead of it, but if it puts in
a substantial amount of effort, it can lay down the foundations for economic diversification.
The Future of Saudi Arabia
What, then, is the future of Saudi Arabia, an oil-dependent rentier state with an
ambitious-looking development plan and a seeming lack of motivation towards actual
implementation? Although the economic and environmental risks of a continued dependence on
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oil are clear, will Saudi Arabia actually achieve a transformation? The answer depends on what
factors truly motivate the Kingdom, and those factors seem to be power and money. Therefore, it
seems that Saudi Arabia will continue exporting oil until the triangle between oil, power, and
money is broken. It appears that an evaporation of global oil demand could drive a Saudi
decision to reduce its dependence on oil, given that this would cause the “money” side of the
triangle to be broken. As Cordesman explains, Saudi Arabia will continue exporting oil as long
as the world remains dependent on it for much of its energy (2003, p. 383), given that an oildependent world means economic prosperity for the Kingdom. As Gavata pointed out, the
Kingdom is a business, and as long as global prices and demand remain high enough, it will
continue exporting oil (personal communication, November 16, 2018).
Although it seems likely that falling global oil demand will drive Saudi Arabia to
diversification, it does not appear that this process will come about because of global
decarbonization, at least not in its current form. Although decarbonization theoretically
represents an incentive for Saudi Arabia decrease its dependence on oil and switch to solar
energy, the current global initiatives remain limited by self-interested countries that are unwilling
to commit to more ambitious initiatives. Luciani also believes that current efforts are not
determined enough to affect demand anytime soon. “It’s difficult to envisage in the current
political environment,” he agrees (personal communication, November 5, 2018).
However, it seems plausible that demand for fossil fuels, specifically oil, would begin to
fall should solar and other clean energy sources become less expensive. Luciani believes that
Saudi Arabia will continue producing oil as long as it is in demand in the world, but that if the
world develops alternative energy sources that are “truly competitive with oil”, the price of oil
may decline, giving Saudi Arabia more of an incentive to diversify its energy sources and
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economy. Ultimately, however, Luciani acknowledges the conveniences of oil and believes that
new alternatives are not likely to very well compete with fossil fuels (personal communication,
November 5, 2018). At some point, however, it seems likely that prices for solar and other
renewable technologies will become economically competitive with oil, but as Cordesman
stated, a “massive shift in energy technology” will have to occur before this can happen.
Also possible is that the “power” segment of the oil-money-power triangle will break,
perhaps due to a worsening of domestic problems in Saudi Arabia. As earlier discussed, it is the
objective of a rentier state to keep hold of its power, but this power could start slipping from the
Kingdom if unemployment continues to worsen and domestic energy demand continues to strain
the budget. Additionally, as Finaud explains, ever since the Arab Spring, the people have wanted
more freedom and more rights, and this is partially why the Kingdom put in place reforms—not
for the benefits of development, but to placate the people. The regime is very vulnerable, and its
choices are driven by its desire to survive (personal communication, November 22, 2018).
Therefore, if at some point the Kingdom realizes that oil is no longer an effective way to do this,
it might be more inclined to more fully diversify its economy and invest in solar power.

Conclusion
This study has examined the role of oil in Saudi Arabia, noting its importance in the
Kingdom’s socioeconomic development, domestic programs, economic well-being, and
international influence. It has been made clear that oil is a source of power for the Kingdom, as it
legitimizes the regime’s distinctly non-democratic authority over its citizens. The economic
importance of diversification was explained on the basis of oil’s price volatility and effect on the
Saudi budget and social programs, which is again tied to the regime’s power. It was also
explained that Saudi Arabia’s domestic challenges, including growing energy demand,
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population, and unemployment cannot be solved by oil, and instead require investment in the
private sector and solar energy. Changing global energy trends and global warming may also
require Saudi Arabia to export less oil, making a transition to solar energy still more beneficial.
This transition is certainly possible and could provide a significant amount of benefits for the
Kingdom, should it be willing to work through some potential challenges. Finally, Saudi Arabia
must realize the importance of increasing the role of the private sector and attracting foreign
investment, and it should begin to take the necessary steps toward these goals. Although Vision
2030 does not seem like a plan that will transform Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom can still change its
mindset and start on a path towards diversification and solar energy.
It is important to point out that this study does not include an analysis of nuclear energy,
another renewable energy option that the Kingdom has been exploring. Future research on this
topic should include this aspect of the diversification problem in order to present a more
comprehensive analysis of the situation. Furthermore, recent political events could be taken into
account in the discussion of the Kingdom’s power, specifically the Khashoggi murder, which has
had a significant effect on the Kingdom’s international and domestic image. It remains to be seen
what effect this will have on the oil-power-money triangle, but it may very well have an impact
on the Kingdom’s ability to retain power, a question that could be studied by future scholars in
the context of oil dependence and foreign relations.
Even if Saudi Arabia does not begin to seriously diversify its economy or embrace solar
energy, the Kingdom will be forced to stop relying on oil eventually. Whether this comes about
voluntarily, because of evaporating demand, or because the oil simply runs out, serious economic
changes will eventually have to be made in the Kingdom. It would be advisable for Saudi Arabia
to be prepared for this day, even if it seems far off, in order to avoid an economic catastrophe
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that could lead to domestic unrest and spillover effects in the Gulf region and Middle East. This
is a transition that will take a substantial amount of time, so the Kingdom should begin the
process as soon as possible in order to avoid this potential economic, domestic, and
environmental crisis. Will the Kingdom realize these risks and make a voluntary transition away
from its dependence on oil, or will it face the end of a stubborn rentier state that simply withers
away when its oil reserves dry up? What will come to pass cannot yet be seen, but it appears that
the Kingdom will make its choices on the basis of power and money. Although the future is
unclear, Saudi Arabia has the power to determine its fate. Now is the time for action.

Abbreviation list
CSP = concentrated solar power

EIA = Energy Information Administration
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EU = European Union
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council
IEA = International Energy Agency
IMF = International Monetary Fund
ISIS = The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MENA = Middle East and North Africa
PV = photovoltaic
UN = United Nations
UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WTO = World Trade Organization
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ISP Work Journal
Chronology of ISP Research
Monday, October 1
While Brussels, I prepared a few questions and visited the think tank Bruegel. There I asked for
Dr. Simone Tagliapietra, who I had previously emailed. He agreed to see me, and I recorded our
interview, the transcription of which can be found in the “Interview Transcripts” section of this
journal.
October 5
While in Paris, I scheduled an interview with Emilie Magdalinski, a research fellow and expert
on European energy policy at the Jacques Delors Institute. However, this interview was more for
background knowledge about the energy choices of the EU than about Saudi Arabia, and I did
not directly use it for my paper, so I have not included the transcript for it. It did help to inform
me about European energy trends, but again, it was not directly applicable to my ISP, since my
focus shifted more towards Saudi Arabia as I continued my research.
Tue. Oct 17
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I worked on centering my topic and figuring out what I really wanted to focus on. After several
false starts, I was able to carve out a better research question. I also searched for a greater
literature and for people to contact, and I found several potential interviewees at the Graduate
Institute of Geneva. I also submitted my ISP final proposal.
Thurs. Oct 18
We went to the “Environment House” of the UNEP and heard Elena Antoni speak about the
green economy and trade. Afterward, given the relevance of her lecture to my topic, I asked Ms.
Antoni some questions about my ISP topic. This spontaneous brainstorming process helped
guide some of my thinking about my research topic; this informal interview was thoughtprovoking and helpful, as I was in the beginning stages of the research process. Ms. Antoni also
indicated her interest in my research and gave me her email so that I could email her my ISP
once it was finished.
Mon. Oct 29
I went to the SIT library and looked through almost all of the old ISPs in the sections for
development, energy, and economics in search of a topic similar to mine. I came across one that
was on a topic relevant to development and oil, so I flipped through it for some ideas. After I was
finished consulting the SIT library, I continued the brainstorming process and continued
searching for sources online.
Tue. Oct 30
I went to the library in Geneva and sent out several emails. I emailed interview requests to Dr.
Joelle Noailly and Mr. Giacomo Luciani from the Graduate Institute. I also emailed Marc Finaud
asking him to be my advisor, and he replied back affirmatively. I then read over the rubric for the
ISP so as to better understand which qualities I should strive to embody in my paper. I also
familiarized myself with the format of the ISP and continued to develop my topic.
Fri. Nov 2
I went to the library of the Graduate Institute of Geneva to look for additional sources. I found a
number of helpful books, eight to be specific, and spent the following six and a half hours going
through and taking notes on each of them. I made great strides in my examination of existing
literature, and wrote down relevant quotes and ideas that the various authors put forward. I
absorbed much information and left feeling much more informed on my topic. This was probably
the most helpful and productive day of the entire ISP session; I covered a lot of ground, found
and read through my most important sources, and finally pinpointed what aspects of the problem
I wanted to focus on in my project.
Mon. Nov 5
In the morning, I had an interview with Giacomo Luciani, one of the foremost experts in the field
of the economic development of resource-rich MENA countries and energy. We spoke for half
an hour, and he provided me with some very helpful information. The transcript of the interview
can be found in the “Interview Transcripts” section. Following this interview, I went to the SIT
office to speak with Dr. Csurgai about my paper and the research and networking process. Then,
in the afternoon, I had an advisor meeting with Mr. Finaud. We spoke about the basics of my
paper and some possible routes I could take. I do not have a record of the questions I asked him,
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as they were more general and spontaneous, but a description of this meeting can be found in the
“Advisor Meetings” section.
Tue. Nov 6
At the library of Geneva, I went through all of my sources and cited each one. This was to both
to mentally account for all of my sources, as well as to ensure that I did not have to complete the
citations at the last minute. I continued to take notes on these sources and began to consider my
outline for the ISP.
Thur. Nov 8
I completed my mid-ISP documents, including my title, outline, sources, and networking
strategies. I also found two more potential interviewees and tried to find their contact
information. Since I could not find their information, I emailed the general information email
address. I then emailed Dr. Csurgai asking him if he had any knowledge of how to contact
professors at the Geneva School of Diplomacy, and he recommended someone to call.
Mon. Nov 12
I was able to call the Geneva School of Diplomacy, and after some miscommunication, they
gave me an email address that could get me in contact with the professors. I sent and email and
awaited a response.
Tue. Nov 13
In the morning I went to my mid-ISP meeting. I spoke with Dr. Mattila about the content of my
paper, networking, and some other strategies. In the afternoon, since I had not gotten an email
back from the School of Diplomacy, I took the bus there and talked to the office worker. He
informed me that they had sent Mr. Gavata an email asking for permission to share his contact
information, and that they would get back to me by tomorrow, latest. He added that he would be
extra diligent about this since I had taken the time to come to the office. I then went to the UN
library to work on my paper and ended up color coding all of my notes since there were so many
of them that it was overwhelming. I gave a different color to the information and quotes
dependent on what part of the paper I would use them in. This was extremely helpful to the
organization of my notes, my thoughts, and would prove very helpful as I began the writing
process.
Wed. Nov 14
I began the writing process by typing out my general thoughts and ideas, and I followed my
outline as best as I could. I typed approximately four pages out and contemplated the format that
I would take for the rest of the paper.
Thur. Nov 15
I went to the library in Geneva and continued drafting out my paper, writing six more pages. I
reached a bit of a dead end and went back to revise and rethink what I had written. I spent
several hours in this process, trying to get my bearings in the paper.
Fri. Nov 16

Mouritsen 40
I went to the UN library briefly to work on my paper, continuing to revise what I had previously
written. I then went to Chateau de Penthes for an interview with Mr. Cornel Gavata. Our meeting
lasted a total of three hours, 30 minutes of which I recorded. This half-hour segment contained
my prepared questions, while the other 2.5 hours was spent talking more freely about issues
related to my ISP. A summary of the half-hour can be found in the “Interview Transcripts”
section.
Mon. Nov 19
I went to the SIT office to do some work on my paper, after which I went to the UN library and
spent the afternoon continuing to write my draft.
Tue. Nov 20
I went to the University of Geneva library and continued writing and editing my draft of the
paper. It felt very disorganized, which was frustrating, so I tried to rethink my strategy of
approaching the paper, but this did not help very much.
Thur. Nov 22
I had my second advisor meeting with Mr. Finaud, during which I asked him more specific
questions about my topic and ISP, which can be found in the “Advisor Meetings” section of this
work journal.
Fri. Nov 23
I worked on the train to and from Zurich, writing my ISP and finding the flaws in my logic. This
process was helpful, but the latter portion of my paper remained fairly disorganized. At this
point, I had written about twenty pages.
Sat. Nov 24
I spent a good deal of time adding to my paper and finally completed a full draft, which I
emailed to Mr. Finaud. This work was done at home and took several hours. I also sent the
recording of our interview to Mr. Gavata, who had requested it.
Sun. Nov 25
I worked both on the train from Brig and also once back at home editing my draft. I cleaned up
my sentences and logic, and completed all of my citations. I spent from late afternoon to bedtime
reading over and revising my ISP.
Mon. Nov 26
I reworked the structure of the paper, which I had realized was not flowing appropriately, and
completely revised my literature review. I made some necessary changes to the paper, finished
up my work journal, and worked from the morning until dinnertime editing and rewriting my
ISP.
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Advisor Meetings
My first advisor meeting with Mr. Finaud took place on November 5th. During this
meeting, I explained my topic to him and described my research process up until that point and
asked him questions about the research process. He also spoke about Saudi Arabia and its
relationship with the region around it, as well as opportunities and politics of using nuclear
energy. We spoke about diversification and the political economy of the region, and it was more
of a general meeting than one to address specific problems I was having. My second advisor
meeting took place on November 22nd, since Mr. Finaud had been out of town. This time, I had
more specific questions for him regarding the context in Saudi Arabia and its international
relationships, such as: I was reading that Washing has provided financial, political, and military
support to Saudi Arabia; can you expand more about the forms that this support has taken and
how it is connected to oil? Finaud talked about security guarantees and military support and the
connection between oil and weapons. I also asked: How does the instability in the region affect
Saudi Arabia’s ability to focus on its development, and how might the Kingdom begin to focus
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more on its national and regional development instead of power plays and proxy wars? Finaud
spoke about the domestic unrest in Saudi Arabia and how the Khashoggi murder has tarnished
the image of the Crown prince and made the regime vulnerable. I then asked about which allies
could help Saudi Arabia make an energy transition happen. Finaud explained that Saudi Arabia
doesn’t need to turn to governments, they can just start building and offering a good salary, and
that will attract investors. The question would be if they could build something reliable. I also
asked about the role of ISIS, and Finaud spoke about Saudi Arabia’s funding of radical islamists,
its international image, and its direct influence on radical Islam in the US and Europe.
Interview Transcripts
FORMAL INTERVIEW ONE with Simone Tagliapietra, Oct. 1 2018 (transcript)
Sofia: So, the IMF has urged SA and other Gulf countries to diversify their economies away
from oil dependency. But in your opinion, how much should these countries diversify their
economies given that comparative advantage suggests that, you know, it is rational to export
what comes naturally to you in terms of resources. So essentially, right now, if an economy is not
diverse enough, when does it become too diverse and stop taking advantage of its plentiful
resources?
ST: Well, I mean, SA like other countries in the Gulf, all these are countries extremely focused
on oil and gas production and export. Diversifying the economy, it is an imperative for macroprudential reasons, because it’s always better to have a diversified economic basis that allows
you to also manage also external shocks in a more safe way. And in the case of the Gulf
countries, it is also very important to consider that with climate change policy becoming more
and more, like incisive at the global level, with the unpredictable rise of electric vehicles, the
demand for oil in the future is a question mark. So these countries cannot be inprepared [sic] in
the case something goes wrong from their perspective on oil demand. So they should be able to
have an alternative, otherwise they will simply close down the country one day and leave. So for
these reasons, all countries have put in place actually— I have a paper that I wrote a few, I think
last year, and I can share it with you, exactly on this topic. So I have a table with all the policies
that these countries are putting in place to diversify, but I am also mentioning that these countries
often put in place such policies when oil prices are low. And then when oil price starts to go up,
they all of a sudden forget about this issue and go back to the business as usual. So in my view,
these countries should pursue what they themselves plan to do, and the first step in that direction
is certainly a progressive phase-out of energy subsidies, which remain very important in these
countries. And which are very inefficient under the economic perspective, because that’s how a
lot of money at the state is spent, and it is also very ineffective under an energy perspective

Mouritsen 43
because energy subsidies lead to an inefficient use of energy, of oil and gas. So energy subsidy
reform is a major issue in these countries for diversification.
Sofia: Certainly. And you’re talking about how countries, that the future of dependence on oil in
European is uncertain, and so sort of following on that, with regards to the EU’s 2020, 2030,
2050 plans to cut emissions and increasing energy efficiency, how soon do you see them
decreasing their dependence on oil, specifically?
ST: Well, I mean, the EU has clearly a strong policy to decarbonize the economy. In November
we will have a new road map 2050 from the EU on the energy and climate issue, and the idea is
to fully decarbonize the economy by 2050. So by 2050, ideally, we should have zero oil and gas
around. That tells you the time frame. So it’s not that much into the future, it is really around the
corner.
Sofia: Certainly. Okay, thank you. And… there’s also the dimension of— the EC has said that
Europe has increasingly been dependent on importing oil, so that might be, even as they are
decreasing dependence in the later future, in the near future, as dependence on imported oil
increases, how do you think that may affect the oil market or the energy market specifically,
given that Europe is increasingly becoming dependent on importing? So, essentially, before we
make the switch to clean energy and are still somewhat dependent, do you think that will lead to,
you know, a brief spike in oil prices, or, how do you think…
ST: No, but first of all you have to contextualize. It’s not just Europe, Europe is a part of the
global market. So, I don’t think what happens in Europe necessarily leads to spikes in prices, but
for Europe itself it’s an issue. Because if you have a rising oil price, then the economic
competitiveness of Europe decreases and remember that there is always a security of energy
supply issue which is always very important, and that’s particularly related to the dependency of
Europe on Russian gas. So Europe is concerned by its over-dependency on Russian in energy
terms and wants to diversify, how? Renewable efficiency, to not to use the amount of resources
that we currently import.
Sofia: I see. And, given that the international energy market seems to be moving, happily,
towards sustainable energy, do you think it’s possible that nations like SA, that previously were
so dependent on exporting oil could switch to more like, being a very important player in clean
energy?
ST: Yes, of course. And all of them are trying to invest a lot, particularly into the RND**, the
research and development, for solar energy and other clean energy solutions. So I think that
if they put in place the right investments, they could have a role to play there because they have
plenty of money. And they could make use of sovereign wealth funds, so public money they earn
through oil export, to invest into new technology, so there can be of course a role.
Sofia: And you did mention solar, and a lot of people point to solar as a way for the Gulf
countries specifically to get involved. Do you think that that will play a very large role in the
future, given how that just makes sense for that particular region?
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ST: Yes, I mean, the sun is very strong there, so they can actually produce a lot of electricity
with it to consume domestically or also to export it. So that is certainly something that is a
feasible option and with the declining cost of the solar technology, that is really declining very
strongly, that becomes more and more possible in the future.
Sofia: Okay. And finally, many experts point to lack of investment as one of SA’s key issues.
And there’s lots of talk about how the government is going to help invest for the economy to
grow, but of course, some doubt that the government can be a reliable investor in the economy
given that its spending is so dependent on—you know, if oil prices fall, so does government
spending. So how do you think that SA or other countries like it could better utilize the energy
market itself in order to stimulate investment in particular?
ST: I think that today the prices of oil are up to $82 per barrel; that means that SA is doing a lot
of profits. I think they should make a very good use of their SWF in order to invest this money
wisely into clean energy companies around the world, and then they should try to really engage
more with them, also to do joint partnerships with Saudi companies, for example Saudi Aramco,
to make together projects not only in the Gulf but also in the region, in the Middle East. And I
would point out that the real potential is Africa. Because Africa has a huge problem with energy
access, lack of energy access. Many people do not have access to electricity. And renewable
energy particularly at the rural area can provide a great solution. What is needed is the
investment. The Gulf has the money to do that, Africa provides a great market potential, so there
is a perfect match between the two. So that’s a possible synergy for the future that I would see.
END OF INTERVIEW.
______________________________________________________________________________
FORMAL INTERVIEW TWO with Giacomo Luciani, Nov. 5, 2018 (transcript)
Sofia: So, in my research of this topic, it seems fairly evident from both an economic and an
environmental standpoint that Saudi Arabia should diversify its economy. But given its
resources, what kinds of jobs and sectors would it make the most sense for Saudi Arabia to invest
in?
GL: It has been evident for a long time that SA needed to diversify. You have to keep in mind
that SA when oil was discovered was a very simple economy based on growing dates and camels
and goats. I think it has been very clear in the minds of the Saudi government that they needed to
do something to diversify. And they have done a lot to diversify and obviously until now they
have tended to diversify mostly, but not exclusively, based on the available resources, which
means diversifying based on oil and gas. In fact the diversification drive in SA started with the
devaluation of gas. At the beginning, we are talking about the 1960’s, okay? Most of the gas was
being simply flared because it had no commercial value. So the Saudi government moved
towards the oil companies, primarily Aramco that held the largest concession at the time and told
them, because you are doing nothing with this gas we are going to take it for free. And so they
built this gas gathering system, which has been a crucially important early initiative, and utilized
the gas for power generation for beginning the petrochemical industry and ever since, this has
continued. And the Saudis have made huge strides, especially petrochemicals, they are one of the
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major producers and exporters of petrochemicals in the world, so the country is not just a crude
exporter and the situation has much evolved. Of course, as this process of diversification
continued you have moved, you have had all sorts of other initiatives, perhaps primarily devoted
to satisfying domestic demand. So you have the production of construction material you have
construction, the building of cities, you have a financial system that has developed banks, the
stock exchange and so on and so forth, so plus also other manufacturing industries especially in
areas that are ancillary for the oil industry, so for examples pipes, vessels… this is a process that
is ongoing and has, and will continue, so you have to look at the different point of view of
integration from the oil and gas business both downstream, meaning, you know, adding value to
oil and gas as it is produced, and so producing more and more downstream petrochemicals,
sophisticated petrochemicals or materials for industry. And upstream, so more and more
attracting and developing within the kingdom the kind of industry which is needed for the oil and
gas industry. So in addition the kingdom also has other resources which are not related to oil and
gas. It has resources of bauxite, that are already allowing an integrated producing of aluminum, it
has resources of sand, which allows for the production of silica, and so on and so forth, I might
continue, there are several other minerals available in the kingdom, so there is considerable
potential for diversification based on these resources.
Sofia: How feasible do you think it is for the Kingdom to move towards clean energy as a way in
which to diversify? What challenges and opportunities would Saudi Arabia face, if it decided to
go that route, to enter that market?
GL: There are considerable opportunities for clean energy and it is clear that the kingdom relies
excessively on the use of oil and gas for electricity production. In the end, eventually, you know,
this oil and gas could be more fruitfully utilized for industry, okay, rather than being used for
power generation. Obviously the kingdom has potential for solar energy, although there are, you
know, complications, and it is too simplistic to say that because there is a lot of sun it is easy to
do solar. There are plenty of complications, but certainly, you know, solar energy is a possibility.
There is also along the coast the possibility for wind energy, and I believe that the kingdom
offers strong potential for the development of nuclear power, just as the UAE are doing, as
especially Abu Dhabi is doing, I think that they have expressed an interest in doing the same,
they are just moving very cautiously in this direction, but eventually they will be.
Sofia: You mentioned challenges to moving towards solar. What specifically do you think those
would be?
GL: Well, you know, when you look at the details, you will find several problems, first of all, the
desert is dusty, and when the wind blows it lifts lots of sand in the air, and solar panels are
vulnerable to that, they need to be constantly cleaned, cleaning has to be done carefully because
otherwise they get scratched, and depending on whether you are talking about photovoltaic or
concentrated solar power, concentrated solar power is based on mirrors, mirrors are especially
vulnerable. So, you know, a recent major project in Oman which will deliver steam to an oil
operation, it’s a huge project, solar project, has the mirrors, the concentrating mirrors enclosed in
a, basically a hot house, in glass, so the cost of that is of course to be added because in Baghdad
it is necessary because otherwise the mirrors would be useless after a year. Also along the coast
in both the Red Sea coast and the Gulf Coast, humidity is a problem, and humidity is a problem
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because it deposits on the mirrors of the photovoltaic panels and does not allow it to work well, it
also, in fact during the summer, the sun doesn’t shine so much in SA, you always have a light
cover of very high clouds, so it is a misconception to believe—it is very hot, but in terms of
irrigation, it is not as clean and effective as one might wish. And finally it is a simple fact that
photovoltaic panels work best lower temperatures. So when they heat at 50, 60 or even more
degrees, they don’t work very efficiently.
Sofia: Okay. Even if the kingdom didn’t choose to go the route of clean energy, it seems that oil
is closely tied to the power of the Kingdom, given that oil revenues fund the budget that funds
the welfare systems that keeps citizens happy. So what kind of impact do you think this has on
the Kingdom’s ability to really invest in clean energy, or even any market aside from oil? What
would have to change for real concrete implementation to take place of a new market?
GC: Oh, I think the benefit of investing in clean energy is already evident and the Saudi
government is committed to this policy and has been committed for a long time. It is the
implementation that is difficult, it is difficult because typically, solar and wind energy is based
on smaller projects, okay, so it is complicated from the point of view of decision making. You
need to make numerous decisions, select locations, decide what kind of plant you are going to
do. The government is not well-suited for that, okay, the government, bureaucracy has difficulty
making decisions. Decision making power is concentrated at the top, and the attention of the top
is difficult to get, so if you need a hundred decisions on a hundred sides, you never get it. It’s
something that the system finds difficulty dealing with. So the private sector should be doing it,
but this contains the relationship between the public and the private sector and that is always
very difficult. The attitude is that the government should always be in control, the private sector
should be restricted to doing what the government tells them to do, the private sector of course
doesn’t very much like this. They want to have freedom of initiative, freedom of choice, freedom
of making profits, and so, it’s not an easy interface to navigate.
Sofia: Do you think that attitude would change anytime soon, between the government/public
sector and the private sector? What do you think would make the kingdom more encouraging of
the private sector to step in some situations?
GL: It’s not easy to predict. At the moment I see little sign that the government is ready to allow,
genuinely allow, widened scope for the private sector. has moved in the direct of even more
clearly subjecting the private sector to government control and direction. So at the moment I
don’t see an evolution. There have been, in the past, moments when the pendulum has swung in
the favor of the private sector. This is not at the moment what is happening, but then of course it
can change again. It has to do with the power structure at the top.
Sofia: Right. So, you were talking about how SA understands that it needs to diversify, and you
can sort of see that in its Vision 2030 plan. That plan seems ambitious on the surface; do you
think that it will really have the kind of impact that it says it will? Does it really put the country
on a transformative trajectory? How effective do you think that plan will be?
GL: SA has been planning for development and diversification since 1970. The first
development plan was in 1970. So there have been a succession of development plans frequently
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discounted as being ineffective but in fact in my opinion they have been very useful tools to
avoid initiatives that were not well thought-out. Frequently when initiatives, projects were
undertaken outside of the plans, they have turned out to be wrong or ill-considered. So a large
number of wrong investment or ill-considered investment has been made. The 2030 is nothing
new, okay, Vision 2030 is nothing new, it’s not the first vision. And it does not contain much
that is really remarkable except the tendency to shift the emphasis from two* economic
diversification, which means industrial diversification, this is continuing but you know what’s in
2030 is a vision of financial diversification of creating a large sovereign fund that will invest
outside of the country, globally. Now this is new because until now, until two or three years ago,
the kingdom has always pursued a policy of diversifying its own economy, not seeking financial
diversification. It’s the like of Abu Dhabi or Qatar that are seeking financial diversification,
much smaller countries with smaller populations which can visualize themselves living off
accumulated global investment in, way into the future. But SA is much to big and complex and
has much too large a population to live off financial rents accumulated in the SWF. It has to
produce value added itself, and so it needs economic diversification through diversification
rights of its economic activities. So I think that, I’ve personally been skeptical of Vision 2030
from the start, and you know, I think so far, skepticism has proven to be well justified.
Sofia: What role do you think SWFs, specifically SA’s, will play or should play in these coming
years?
GL: Well, exactly. The question is whether it makes sense for SA to build a large SWF. You see,
a SWF is expected to invest internationally, okay, if you are investing domestically you are just
creating an investment fund, and fine. But the idea is that you are investing internationally that’s
what. That is justified when, if you don’t have enough good opportunities for investing
domestically in you own country. In the past we used to speak about absorption capacity in
profitable investment, then okay, you may consider investing internationally. Or if you are an
economy like Norway, which is already advanced, industrialized, diversified, and you are afraid
of creating a Dutch disease effect, you are essentially sterilizing these funds into a SWF. And
then at some point you like to decide what to make with them, how to use them, because Norway
keeps accumulating funds, their so-called pensions fund, but it is not clear when they will make
use of this money, they are just sitting on top of this pile of cash, invested internationally, very
successfully invested internationally, for the time when oil will run out. But this is not any time
soon, so it’s not clear what benefit Norway derives from this. A country like SA has multiple
opportunities still for investment in the country itself, so it’s not clear why they should prioritize
international investment.
Sofia: You did also mention the population in SA. Demographic growth has proven a challenge,
it seems. Not only are there a lot of young people who need to be employed, there is also
growing domestic energy demand. How do you think that Saudi Arabia could use the
diversification process to its advantage in order to both reduce its dependence on oil and also
create jobs for its young and growing population?
GL: Okay, the issue of employment in SA is very peculiar because in fact SA employs a very
large number of expatriates, okay, so there are very large number of temporary immigrants that
are employed, that have jobs, and Saudi’s don’t have, there are not enough jobs acceptable to
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Saudis. The reason for that is that SA, in order to protect its private sector, in order to avoid the
Dutch disease, has always followed a policy of low wages, of keeping wages low, okay, and you
can do that if you rely on expatriates. By relying on expatriates essentially what you’re creating
is a condition of practically infinite supply of labor and you end up importing the wage rate of
Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, okay, which is a wage rate that no Saudi will accept, because it’s not,
it’s acceptable to people from these countries, but not to a Saudi. So the real question is that, they
have to shift from a model that is based on low wages, cheap labor, to a model that progressively
allows for higher wages and fewer workers, higher productivity, greater mechanization, greater
use of capital, so in the mix between labor and capital you have to increase the role of capital and
decrease the number of workers. And in that process, drastically reduce the number of expatriate
workers, and if wages increase, and protect the expatriate workers, allow them to earn salaries in
line with the salaries of the nationals instead of being much lower and taking jobs away from the
nationals. We are in Switzerland and Switzerland is a very clear example of a country that is also
largely dependent on immigrant labour, because if you look around, there are plenty of
foreigners in this place, who work here. But these foreigners make very good wages and they are
not allowed to work for less than a national and the level of wages in this country is extremely
high in international comparison, much higher than in any of the neighboring countries,
including Germany, and yet the country is competitive. So you can — you can, and you
should— put through a policy of quality rather than quantity, okay? Productivity defined as
value added by a worker in SA has been declining over the years. How can that be? It can be
because it is so cheap to hire another Bangladeshi, another Sri Lankan, another Pakistani, that
people don’t care about investing in any capital at all. And the productivity of the marginal hired
expatriate is very low. But you have to aim at increasing productivity, wages, reducing the
number of expatriates and increasing the capital intensity in the economy. That’s what needs to
be done.
Sofia: Right. And finally, I realize that it’s hard to tell the future, but I do wonder… what do you
think the ultimate push factor will be for SA to eventually get away from oil? Economic,
environmental, global pressures? What do you think will really have the most impact on that real
transformation?
GL: SA will produce oil for us as long as oil is in demand in the world. And oil is expected by
most people to be in demand for many decades to come. So, the value, the economic value, the
price of oil may decline if we find ways of developing alternative energy sources that are truly
competitive with oil. The global drive towards improved living standards, the wish to have
greater mobility, access to ownership of cars, demand for transportation generally, independently
of cars. You know cars, light duty passenger vehicles, only account for 25% of global oil
demand. The rest is, to a large extent, trucks, airplanes, ships, and so on and so forth, so in a
world of globalization, of intensification, of global trade, demand for transportation will increase,
and oil has some characteristics that are very difficult to substitute for. Because it is liquid, it is
easily handled, stored, and it packs a huge amount of energy in a very small volume. So in terms
of powering a transport unit, a means of transport, it’s unparalleled in its convenience. So you
may give up on some of these things and find alternatives, but they are not likely to very well
compete with oil. So we need a much more determined global effort to decarbonize, which
[inaudible] is not happening. It is difficult to envisage in the current political environment. END
OF INTERVIEW.
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______________________________________________________________________________
FORMAL INTERVIEW THREE with Cornel Gavata, November 16, 2018 (summary)
Question 1: I am researching the possibility of the Saudi oil-based economy to transition to one
that is largely based on sustainable, clean energy. What do you think are some challenges that
any country that is in this sort of transition might face, and if you are versed in Saudi Arabia,
what challenges might it specifically face?
What kind of clean energy? Solar? Well, it’s the right country for solar. 90.5% desert, most of it
uninhabited, large areas can be used for solar panels without displacing populations, and very
high solar radiance so the panels would be very effective there. What is lacking is the
infrastructure. With hydrocarbons they can continue with what they are currently doing. In a few
years they might find an oil peak, in 5-10 years, I don’t think the oil peak will be beyond that if it
hasn’t already plateaued today. And many say, when the Saudi peaks, the world will peak, and
some countries already have. This is probably true, when Saudi peaks the global decline is
certain. So it’s a necessary transition. But oil will peak, energy might not. The large empty desert
means they can use a lot of panels with minimal displacement. And they can remain in the
energy business exporting electricity, perhaps by high voltage direct current lines which can
transport energy very long distances. Hydrogen could also be used to power some types of
vehicles. Vision 2030, it did not specifically address this, but it should include something like it.
Such a high dependency on energy export cannot be removed, but perhaps it can be a different
kind of energy, electricity and hydrogen, they can remain an exporter. The investments would
have to be really vast for solar funds. Yes, the world can be powered in solar power,
infrastructure would have to be vast, but I don’t think an individual country can afford it, it
would have to be a global portrait, but they could be a major part of that.
Question 2: What kind of measures and steps does a country and its government have to take
before it can begin a meaningful energy transition?
It’s ultimately a political decision. They don’t need solar power, they have enough energy.
However, if the want to maintain a large export of energy, it will be necessary to switch to
exporting electricity and hydrogen. They already consume around 30% of the oil they extract.
Also there is a rising population, and the current plans for providing some employment for the
nationals will involve some degree of industrialization, which means consuming more energy. So
internal consumption will increase, they might eventually have very little to export, but this is
not happening right now.
Question 3: Can you please describe the role of the private sector in these kinds of energy
transitions?
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I do not see how SA can become a producer of solar or hydrogen produced electricity alone.
First, the power lines would have to cross a lot of regions into several other continents. One of
the things that needs to be done is to ensure security over the length of the lines. Either you deal
with the issues or you have to make a large, expensive detour. Every extra thousand miles adds
an extra 3-5% loss, which adds up. If you’re forced to bypass certain regions, there might not be
much left when it reaches the destination. And the panels can be done; the costs are immense,
and the benefits have to be shared. First of all, how do you make the panels? They have a lot of
embedded energy and require energy to create them. Right now the most abundant source of fuel
is coal. It cannot be done with oil, natural gas even worse, so coal would have to be used to
create the panels. But then you have clean energy for the future. There has to be a big spike in
coal consumption to make the panels. But then you may not need coal again.
Question 4: Can you please talk about the time frame for this kind of transition? Although it
seems that it would certainly depend on the specific situation of the country, how long do you
think this sort of transition would take?
SA does not have sufficient financial resources to build on its own. It can only be done with
foreign help. But the countries that need energy, the biggest industrial consumers are also
interested in having a secure and stable source of energy. Maybe not oil, maybe electricity of
hydrogen for some transportation, but the sun will still shine and if the transition is not done well
you can still expand the construction for building panels. Can SA do it? It doesn’t need it, for
itself, and if the main consumers do not contribute and share resources, it cannot be done at all.
EU, China, Japan, South Korea, India, and any country aspiring to industrialize. You can’t have
increased consumption with decreased extraction of fossil fuels. Global peaks in oil, gas, and
coal are just around the corner, so it’s about time.
Question 5: In the context of current changing global energy trends and norms, how do you
think the process of a transition from an oil-centered energy base to a sustainable energy base is
affected by initiatives such as the Paris Agreement?
Well, decarbonization—so, natural gas has less carbon than oil and oil less than coal. The only
way to decarbonize is to shift from cheap coal to oil, which has almost peaked, to natural gas,
which is expensive. So how can decarbonization occur based on fossil fuels? Many developing
countries use coal because it is abundant and very cheap compared to natural gas. So to ask poor
developing countries to switch is not designed to help. It’s unaffordable. You can’t ask the poor
to feed themselves with caviar. The cost of solar can only be cut in mass production. Industry
can cut these costs, but right now very little energy comes from solar power, so if you don’t
make the scale larger I don’t think it will ever become cheap. Mass production must kick in.
China is the largest consumer of energy, so it should be very interested in having a secure source
of energy that will last after fossil fuels. So it would make sense for them to be a main player. So
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the world can only make a switch by cooperation between existing large consumers and a mass
production that makes it cheap and available for countries to develop in the future.
Question 6: Realistically, what do you see as being the push for oil-dependent countries to
actually commit to a full energy transition? What do you think will have the most impact among
environmental concerns, demand for oil, global norms…?
SA is looking out for its own interests. The countries of transit for power lines, etc., they all have
to benefit otherwise it will not be done. A mutually beneficial global portrait.
Question 7: When do you see these transitions happening? Quite soon, or later in the century?
We don’t have that much time. There are some insanely optimists, but most calculations and
forecasts are foretelling a peak rather soon. And not all the fossil fuels will peak at the same
time. Maybe oil, then natural gas, then coal, but the peak will come rather soon, even for coal.
This doesn’t necessarily mean running out; Iran peaked in oil extraction, but they are still
extracting, they just never again have that high point. And the existing price will play a role.
There is some price fluctuation, but I don’t think actual price is a good indicator of peak, prices
have gone up and down and they continue to do so. With global demand, recession, boom
cycle… I don’t think that watching the prices will give you any indicator that we are at a peak.
Question 8: What do you think are some possible scenarios for the future of Saudi Arabia or
other oil-based economies?
To put it this way, it is impossible to decarbonize, impossible to change if the consumption of
fossil fuels is increasing, and that will happen if we have no alternatives to that. Selfinterestedness is a driving force, economically if you’re still making money it makes sense that
you would continue. As long as it’s still feasible, with global prices and demand and so on, of
course they will remain in the business. No profitable business is ever a bad one. Regardless of
commitments and so on, commitments can be broken. And some countries don’t want to enter in
commitments as long as they don’t really have an alternative. The world won’t commit to
stagnated growth if they can resist international pressure, only if they have no alternative. I think
it’s not that emissions rise because some countries prefer to be masochist, but what alternative do
they really have? Any commitment is an agreement to abide by international rules. Some
sacrifices are required, true, but if there are only sacrifices and no alternatives, then all the
commitments will be broken.
______________________________________________________________________________
INFORMAL INTERVIEW ONE with Elena Antoni (summary)
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In my discussion with Ms. Antoni, a UN expert on the Green Economy and Trade, we
talked about Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to talk about trade and the environment in the WTO,
about how they have the money to invest quickly in substantial ways, that any sort of greening of
the Saudi economy requires a state decision through public procurement, and that incentivizing
production might be a good road to go down. We also spoke about China’s environmental
standards, as China is a main importer of Saudi oil. This spontaneous brainstorming process
helped guide some of my thinking about my research topic, and this informal interview was
thought-provoking and helpful, as I was in the beginning stages of the research process. Antoni
also indicated her interest in my research and gave me her email so that I could email her my ISP
once it was finished.

Research Locations
Bibliothèque de la Cité
Place des Trois-Perdrix 5, 1204 Genève
Geneva
Library at the Graduate Institute of Geneva
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2, 1202 Genève

United Nations Archives at Geneva
Avenue de la Paix 8-14, 1211

University of Geneva Library
Boulevard du Pont-d'Arve 40, 1205 Genève

Bibliothèque de Genève
Prom. des Bastions 1, 1205 Genève
Human Resource List
Dr. Simone Tagliapietra, Research Fellow at Bruegel; simone.tagliapietra@bruegel.org
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Areas of expertise: International energy and climate issues, international energy markets,
European energy and climate policy and Euro-Mediterranean energy relations.
Mr. Giacomo Luciani, Adjunct professor and co-director of the Executive Master in Oil and Gas
Leadership at the Graduate Institute; giacomo.luciani@graduateinstitute.ch
Areas of expertise: Economic development of resource-rich countries, global governance of
energy, the political economy of the Middle East and North Africa.
Elena Antoni, Green Economy and Trade Specialist at UN Environment; elena.antoni@un.org
Areas of Expertise: Environment and renewable energies, Green Policy and Trade, International
Investment Agreements, the Green Economy, Fisheries policy, UN Environment and WTO
collaboration.
Mr. Cornel Gavata, Assistant Professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and consultant for
the Globecraft Institute; cornel2006@yahoo.co.uk
Areas of expertise: Resource Scarcity, geopolitics, transition to a sustainable energy portfolio.
Emilie Magdalinski, research fellow and expert on European energy policy at the Jacques Delors
Institute; magdalinski@delorsinstitute.eu
Areas of expertise: EU energy policies
Marc Finaud, Senior Program Advisor and Arms Proliferation Cluster Leader at the Geneva
Centre for Security Policy; m.finaud@gcsp.ch
Areas of expertise: Arms control and disarmament, the Middle East, international humanitarian
law
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